Military retirement and wealth forecasting during DoD manpower drawdown by Mays, Steven D.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2013-09
Military retirement and wealth forecasting during
DoD manpower drawdown
Mays, Steven D.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
MILITARY RETIREMENT AND WEALTH 









Thesis Co-Advisors:  Thomas Housel 
 William Sharpe 
Second Reader: Johnathan Mun 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2013 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
MILITARY RETIREMENT AND WEALTH FORECASTING DURING DOD 
MANPOWER DRAWDOWN 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Steven D. Mays 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The Department of Defense will be taking preemptive action to reduce its budget in the face of imminent reduction in 
federal spending. The Marine Corps is projected to cut a significant percentage of its current active duty end strength.  
This study focused specifically on the Marine Corps population, both to limit the scope of the study and to 
model the effects of the manpower reduction parameters used on its target population. The Marine Corps will utilize 
temporary early retirement authority (TERA), voluntary separation pay (VSP), enlisted retention, and Officer 
Continuation Boards as the parameters to reduce its end strength in the coming years.   
The target population for this study was career-intentioned Marines officers defined as those Marines 
officers who voluntarily served beyond their initial contractual obligation by accepting a career designation status. 
Some will be separated prior to achieving traditional, 20-year, retirement eligibility. 
This study will draw comparisons between promotion probabilities from known and theoretical data using 
Monte Carlo simulation and other statistical methods to generate a career-decision support tool for the affected 
population of Marines to make informed retirement planning decisions. 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Retirement Planning, Monte Carlo Simulation, Decision Support, Net 
Present Value, Manpower Drawdown, TERA, VSP 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
75 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Steven D. Mays 
Major, United States Marine Corps 
B.S., University of Maryland College Park, 2000 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 














Approved by:  Dr. Thomas Housel 
Thesis Advisor 
    
    




Dr. Johnathan Mun  
Second Reader  
 
 
Dr. Dan Boger  
Chair, Department of Information Sciences 
 iv




The Department of Defense will be taking preemptive action to reduce its budget in the 
face of imminent reduction in federal spending. The Marine Corps is projected to cut a 
significant percentage of its current active duty end strength.  
This study focused specifically on the Marine Corps population, both to limit the 
scope of the study and to model the effects of the manpower reduction parameters used 
on its target population. The Marine Corps will utilize temporary early retirement 
authority (TERA), voluntary separation pay (VSP), enlisted retention, and Officer 
Continuation Boards as the parameters to reduce its end strength in the coming years.   
The target population for this study was career-intentioned Marines officers 
defined as those Marines officers who voluntarily served beyond their initial contractual 
obligation by accepting a career designation status. Some will be separated prior to 
achieving traditional, 20-year, retirement eligibility. 
This study will draw comparisons between promotion probabilities from known 
and theoretical data using Monte Carlo simulation and other statistical methods to 
generate a career-decision support tool for the affected population of Marines to make 
informed retirement planning decisions. 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) will be facing significant budget cuts in the 
near future. In addition to reducing the funding for current and future programs, the DoD 
will taking preemptive action by also implementing a manpower drawdown plan, 
reducing the end strength for each component (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Personnel and Readiness [OSD P&R], 2012).   
The Army is projected to cut approximately 27,000 troops, representing five 
percent of its current end strength of 570,000 soldiers (Murdock, 2012). The Marine 
Corps is projected to cut approximately 20,000 Marines from its end strength, 
representing approximately 10 percent of its current end strength of 202,000 (Murdock, 
2012). The Air Force and Navy will make most of their budget cuts in their program 
spending and will see a less than one percent cut in their overall end strength (Murdock, 
2012). The strategies, tools, and incentives that each component uses to reduce its end 
strength differ among the services.  
This study focused specifically on the Marine Corps population in order to limit 
the scope of the study and to model the effects of the manpower reduction parameters 
used on its target population. The Marine Corps will utilize temporary early retirement 
authority (TERA), voluntary separation pay (VSP), enlisted retention, and Officer 
Continuation Boards as the parameters to reduce its end strength in the coming years 
(Headquarters Marine Corps [HQMC] M&RA, 2012).   
The target population for this study was career-intentioned Marines officers 
defined as those Marines officers who voluntarily served beyond their initial contractual 
obligation by accepting a career designation status. Some will be separated prior to 
achieving traditional, 20-year, retirement eligibility.   
The Marine Corps’ attrition model is shown in Figure 1.  The red-shaded region 
represents the additional Marines proposed to be cut beyond normal attrition as a result of 
the drawdown measures taken. This portion represents about 10 percent of the current 
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officer population.  The officer population at the lower tier is first and second lieutenants.  
The middle tier represents captains.  The top tier represents majors, lieutenant colonels, 
and colonels.  The top two tiers and a small portion of the bottom tier represent the 
affected population of career-intentioned Marines on which this study was focused. The 
general officer population is not projected to be affected by the Marine Corps’ manpower 
reduction plan.  
 
Figure 1.  Marine Corps Drawdown (HQMC M&RA, 2012) 
While continued service to reach the 20-year threshold for active duty retirement 
benefits is not guaranteed for any population of Marines, the Marine Corps’ manpower 
drawdown represents unrealized additional risk for career-intentioned Marines that has 
yet to be quantified.  Understanding the additional risk the drawdown parameters create 
will allow the affected population to make better-informed career decisions and 
simultaneously facilitate the Marine Corps’ end strength reduction goals. 
B. PURPOSE 
This research did not intend to undermine the professional service of career 
Marines or reduce the purpose of continued military service solely to attaining retirement 
entitlements. Its goal was to acknowledge that there are considerations beyond military 
service that the potential affected population of Marines should consider when making 
career decisions and planning for retirement.  
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This research assessed and modeled the effects on the career longevity and wealth 
probabilities of active duty Marine Corps officers in the face of the various manpower 
drawdown parameters to be employed by the Marine Corps.  This research will serve as a 
proof of concept for a decision support tool that will empirically estimate the additional 
risk to career longevity and retirement that individual Marines are exposed to as the result 
of the Marine Corps’ drawdown plan.  
 The results of this study will allow the potentially affected members of the 
population the opportunity to statistically forecast their career longevity.  Existing 
retirement investment theory generally focuses on the “end of working age” retirement 
population. This study modeled the population’s career investment potential to enable 
informed career and retirement planning decisions during the careers of its members.  
This research bridges the gap between the age of military retirees and traditional retirees.   
Based on the results of past officer promotion boards, a career path probability 
tree was created and used to determine the most likely career profiles of Marine officers.  
The historical military pay tables were used to determine how members of the affected 
population should adjust their investment behavior from a determined retirement baseline 
to mitigate the impact of the drawdown on retirement financial security.  
While this research focused on the subpopulation of Marine Corps officers, the 
results may have merit throughout the DoD as well as other organizations with similar 
retirement structures and pensions.  The methodological approach also highlighted the 
ability to make risk decisions in an uncertain environment. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What is the baseline projected wealth of a traditional 20+ year defined benefit 
retirement for career Marine Corps officers? 
What is the risk exposure to the affected population necessary to achieve the 
baseline projected wealth? 
What are the projected effects of the various Marine Corps drawdown parameters 
on the longevity of the affected population of Marine officers? 
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What are the effects of the various Marine Corps drawdown parameters on the 
expected career wealth potential of the affected population of Marine officers? 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The statistics that drive this model can be updated each year as promotion and 
attrition results become available. Newly accessed Marines in the future years can use the 
model to better plan for retirement earlier in their careers without strictly relying on 
nonguaranteed military retirement compensation and traditional investing for future 
wealth. This study was constrained to the parameters that the Marine Corps has chosen to 
reduce its end strength. However, member of other services and employees in private 
industry with similar retirement structures and force shaping may benefit from this study.  
E. SCOPE 
This study only considered the career paths and expected earnings of active duty 
Marine Corps officers who have demonstrated a desire to make the Marine Corps a 
career.  For the purpose of this study, a career-intentioned officer was defined as an 
officer who has been offered and has accepted career designation as reported in the Total 
Force Data Warehouse (TFDW).  This study will have application to other services and 
subpopulations.   
This specific population was chosen because the career path of active duty Marine 
Corps officers is well defined and generally linear.  Unrestricted active duty officers are 
accessed as second lieutenants and remain unrestricted active duty officers for the 
duration of their careers until discharged from active duty either by separation or 
retirement.  While the study may have merit to the other populations that exists within the 
Marine Corps, there are too many career path possibilities to be able to model within the 
limited scope of the study.  
Enlisted Marines not only have the opportunity to serve their entire career in the 
enlisted corps, they also have the ability to transition into the warrant officer or 
commissioned officer corps at widely varying points in their careers.  Likewise, warrant 
officers are accessed from the enlisted population and may transition to restricted 
 5
commissioned officers. The high degree of variation in the enlisted and warrant officer 
career paths would have made the scope of this study too large to be able to account for 
all of the career path possibilities.   
Additionally, a limited forecast of retirement investing was considered for this 
study.  The number of investment options and outcomes was too high to be able to 
accurately model.  Once the effects of the Marine Corps’ drawdown plan are understood, 
they can be applied to the career paths of other populations of Marines that were not as 
easily modeled. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
This study utilized existing data from the Marine Corps’ Total Force Data 
Warehouse (TDFW), the Marine Corps' official data repository which contains more than 
30 years of historical manpower data and personnel information (Total Force Data 
Warehouse [TFDW], n.d.). The historical population of career-designated Marine officers 
was queried for the available years to determine the annual number of career-designated 
officers who were discharged from active duty prior to achieving retirement eligibility. 
This determined the baseline attrition levels prior to the Marine Corps’ drawdown 
implementation. The career paths and longevity of a sample of the career-designated 
officers was queried as well. 
A career longevity and wealth generation model was created using a modified 
Microsoft Excel-based retirement funding model developed by Real Options Valuation, 
Inc. (Mun, 2006).  The model had an underlying investment model to forecast expected 
wealth growth and the required contribution levels throughout the officer’s career, and 
beyond, during the working years prior to the natural retirement age. The model used a 
Monte Carlo simulation of career longevity and promotion probabilities to determine the 
distribution of outcomes. Historical military pay schedules were gathered from 1965 to 
2013.  In addition to estimated pay schedules for FY 2014 through FY2017, future pay 
schedules were forecasted out to 2037 using the best statistical fit of known historical rate 
increases from 1965 to 2013.   
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The promotion probabilities were established for each grade and fiscal year using 
a probability tree based on available statistics from the results of the Marine Corps officer 
promotions boards from 1993 to 2013 provided by the Promotions Branch, Manpower 
Management Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters USMC. The 
Marine Corps’ drawdown parameters were assessed from the model by determining the 
percentages of the affected population that met the requirements for the requisite 
parameter. Future promotion probabilities were forecasted based on the statistical 
distribution of the known year’s results as well the Marine Corps’ known manpower 
reduction goals for the subsequent years.   
The longevity of an officer’s career was based on a TFDW query of officer 
accessions and separations or retirements from 1993 to 2013.  Once the longevity and 
promotion probabilities were known, a stochastic model of the expected value of the 
career wealth for Marine officers was generated based on those statistical probabilities 
and the officers’ expected career longevities.  The investment model was applied to the 
affected population through Monte Carlo simulation to create a distribution of outcomes 
to be analyzed in Chapter IV. 
G. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Department of Defense is financially constrained by congressional mandates 
for its authorized end strength (Murdock, 2012).  Since 2000, the end strength numbers 
have grown to support ongoing contingency operations (Gates, 2011).  With the ending 
of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and in anticipation of projected defense 
budget reductions in the near future, the DoD is planning to significantly reduce its end 
strength during 2013 through 2017 (Murdock, 2012). Attrition is a normal function of 
military manpower shaping (HQMC M&RA, 2012).  A drawdown will force out many 
qualified career-intentioned officers who would otherwise prefer to continue to serve 
until retirement eligible.  The problem is that many career servicemen who planned for a 
traditional military retirement may not know how to reassess or adjust their retirement 
plan when faced with an unexpected separation resulting from a drawdown or involuntary 
separation. 
 7
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. MARINE CORPS MANPOWER SHAPING 
1. DoD Perspective 
With the national debt approaching $17 trillion, the federal government is under 
fire to find ways to curb the momentum in federal spending (Murdock, 2012).  With 20% 
of the total federal budget, the DoD has been the focus of much attention to reduce 
federal spending (OSD P&R, 2012).  While the Air Force and the Navy are looking into 
reducing spending for programs to lessen the burden, the Army and Marine Corps are 
targeting manpower reductions (OSD P&R, 2012). The Marine Corps uses manpower 
force controls and natural attrition as a way to maintain its manpower end strengths and 
desired military occupation combinations (HQMC M&RA, 2012). While much work 
exists to model and forecast natural attrition within the various components (CBO, 2006; 
Warner, 2008), very little research has focused on the effects of the self-imposed attrition 
the force drawdown represents. Because of this lack of research, the Marine Corps has 
proposed a number of drawdown parameters to be aggregately implemented in series 
until the desired end strength is reached in fiscal year 2016 (HQMC M&RA, 2012).  
2. Marine Corps Drawdown Approach 
Each fiscal year the DoD submits its Defense Manpower Requirements Report in 
preparation for the President’s Budget (OSD P&R, 2012).  The report documents the 
military and civilian manpower requirements necessary to support the nation’s military 
capabilities for the fiscal year the report was generated and forecasts the same 
requirement out to five fiscal years (OSD P&R, 2012). In the 2012 report, the Marine 
Corps forecasted a reduction in force by almost 20,000 Marines by fiscal year 2016 (OSD 
P&R, 2012; HQMC M&RA, 2012).  This includes a three percent reduction in the field 
grade officer end strength and a 13 percent decrease in the company grade end strength 
between fiscal years 2011 and 2016 (OSD P&R, 2012). The combined result will be a 
10 percent reduction in the end strength for active duty officers. While the Marine Corps 
has promoted a “keeping the faith” (HQMC M&RA, 2012) approach with respect to its 
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career officers to allow them to at least continue service until achieving retirement 
eligibility, the reality is that there will be a number of career-designated officers who will 
be offered early retirement or involuntarily separated from the Marine Corps prior to 
reaching eligibility for a statutory retirement. The number and effect is unknown. This 
sudden career shift will impact the retirement income of this affected population and 
require additional planning and foresight to account for this new risk to its members’ 
career longevity and livelihood during their retired years.   
a. Marine Corps Career Designation  
The Marine uses career designation as a force-shaping tool (HQMC 
M&RA, 2012).  It is a highly competitive process with the goal of retaining only the best-
qualified officers (HQMC M&RA, 2012). Career designation has become increasingly 
more competitive as the Marine Corps begins to downsize the force to align with the 
DoD goals. The career designation rates for the previous boards are shown in Table 1. A 
declining rate in each competitive category was noted. 
Table 1.   Marine Corps Career Designation Rates (From McNeil, 2013) 
CD BOARD CSS GRN AV GRN LAW AVIATION 
FY11 ORB #1 65%  65% 65% ALL QUALIFIED ALL QUALIFIED
FY11 ORB #2 65%  65% 65% ALL QUALIFIED ALL QUALIFIED
FY12 ORB #1 60% 60% 60% 85% 95% 
FY12 ORB #2 60% 60% 60% 85% 95% 
FY13 ORB #1 55% 55% 55% 85% 95% 
b. Career Designation Process 
When a career designation board convenes, all eligible officers are divided 
into five competitive categories: ground (GRN), combat service support (CSS), aviation 
ground (AV GN), law, and aviation (McNeil, 2013).  The ground category includes the 
0302 Infantry and the 1802, 1803, and 0802 military occupational specialties (MOSs).  
The CSS category includes 0180, 02XX, 0402, 0602, 1302, 3002, 3404, 4302, and 5803 
MOSs. The Aviation Ground category includes the 6002, 6602, 7204, 7208, 7210, and 
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7220 MOSs. The Law category consists of the 4402 MOS, and the aviation category 
consists of all the 75XX MOSs. 
The total number of officers selected for career designation in each 
competitive category is determined by the HQMC Manpower Plans and Policy Division 
(MPP), which determines the retention percentages needed in each category to keep the 
Marine Corps optimally operational (McNeil, 2013). MPP ensures that the officer 
population for the active duty officer corps for each rank and year of service aligns with 
the opportunities for promotion opportunities to the rank of major. An officer who is 
selected for career designation and remains in good standing, is more likely than not to 
have the opportunity for a career through retirement (McNeil, 2013). The imposed 
drawdown parameters lessen that likelihood. 
B. RETIREMENT BEHAVIORS 
1. Age 
Maestas (2009) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2009) showed that people who 
retire in their early 50s often reenter the workforce or “unretire” either because of a lack 
of fulfillment with being retired or because of lack of financial security to support their 
retirement.  Military members reach retirement eligibility after 20 years of active service 
(Age and Service Requirements, 2006). On average, they retire at age 41 for enlisted 
members and at 45 for officers (Warner, 2008).  The traditional or full retirement age for 
nonmilitary workers is determined by the number of years a person works.  Workers who 
entered the workforce after 1960 reach full retirement age for social security benefits at 
age 67 but may take benefits as early as age 62 (SSA, 2013). There exists a 20- to 25-year 
gap between the average retirement age of military officers and the full retirement age 
where Maestas (2009) proposed workers will continue to work in some capacity.   
2. Financial Literacy 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) studied the financial literacy of the U.S. population.  
They conducted a three question survey of 1,500 American adults to ascertain the level of 
understanding people have with the basic economic concepts of risk, diversification, and 
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inflation.  More than 35% of the respondents in the 35 to 50 year-old group indicated that 
they did not know the answer to one or more of the basic questions (Lusardi & Mitchell, 
2011). A low level of financial literacy leads to poor financial decisions (Hurd & 
Rohwedder, 2010) such as choosing mutual funds with high fees; selecting high-cost 
mortgages; and selecting high-cost pension managers (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011); this is 
the age group that encompasses a vast majority of military retirees. They determined that 
those with graduate and postgraduate degrees scored better than all other respondents 
(Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011). All officers in the target population of this study are college 
graduates at the undergraduate level at least. The other dividing factors they considered 
beyond education included sex, race, and age.  
In addition to financial literacy among investors, studies have focused on the 
factors that influence the investment preferences and risk tolerances of individual 
investors.  Utility functions are a way to capture the preferences of an investor as well as 
to determine the amount of risk they are willing to assume with the ultimate goal of 
achieving greater wealth (Sharpe, 1970;  Norstad 1999a). Gustman and Steinmeier (2009) 
observed the necessity for dynamic modeling to account for changing retirement 
behaviors. A single utility function may be too simplistic and lead to biased estimates 
(Gustman & Steinmeier, 2009). The affected population of Marines who were the focus 
of this study was generally younger than the general population of working-age retirees 
upon which much of the theory is based. Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) showed that the 
measure of acceptable risk an individual investor will accept is inversely related to age.  
Lusardi, Mitchell, and Curto (2012) asserted that those who are less financially literate 
are less likely to plan for retirement. This finding highlights the need for those in the 
affected population of this study to consider their career choices and retirement 
investments as early as possible to mitigate the negative effects of poor retirement 
planning.  
3. Risk 
The differences between risk and uncertainty are often misunderstood.  Mun 
(2006) defined risk as that which one bears as the outcome of uncertainty and stated that 
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uncertainty may be reduced with the passing of time or as events occur over time. The 
risk over a given time horizon may remain constant, but as the time horizon increases, the 
level of uncertainty will increase (Mun, 2006).  In formalizing portfolio theory, Sharpe 
(1970) proposed that investors make investment decisions about a group of securities 
with different risk levels to minimize the overall risk exposure of the portfolio when 
compared to an individual investment. The risk of a portfolio is directly proportional to 
the standard error of the probability distribution of the portfolio’s performance outcomes 
(Sharpe, 1970). An individual investor will choose a portfolio that maximizes the 
expected utility of a portfolio (Sharpe, 1970 and Norstad 1999b). Loewenstein, 
O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) asserted that to model optimal investment decision 
making requires a prediction of future tastes. They introduced projection bias as a 
variable that should be considered in utility modeling that accounts for dynamic changes 
in investor preference over time or as the result of major life changes. If not accounted 
for, projection bias can cause an investor to underappreciate changes in investor 
preference and thus work more years and retire later than planned (Loewenstein et al., 
2003).   
Career Marines who are involuntarily separated from active duty will receive a 
separation payment commensurate with their years of service and must make decisions 
about how to invest this payment in order to reach their original retirement financial goals 
without the contribution of retirement compensation. With a large lump sum payment in 
hand, a Marine’s individual preference and discount rate will play a role in how much he 
or she is willing to invest. This must be considered. Deichert (2006) determined that 
Marines have different discount rates that correlate to years of experience (rank or age), 
family composition, and military occupation. Additionally he found that the temporal 
changes in discount rate directly corresponded to a Marine’s experience level.   
C. MILITARY RETIREMENT COMPENSATION  
1. Direct Compensation 
Since 1986, the defined benefit compensation for Marine retirees is an annuity 
payment computed at 2.5 percent of the average of the highest three years annual basic 
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pay times years of service with a minimum of 20 years of service. This will be paid for 
the remainder of the retiree’s life (Age and Service Requirements, 2006).  Compensation 
for Marines who are involuntarily separated is computed as a one-time severance 
payment equal to no more than twice the monthly basic times the years of active service 
with a maximum credit for 12 years of service (CMC, 2001).  The minimum amount of 
retirement compensation is 50 percent of the Marine’s high three average basic pay for 20 
years of service with an increase of 2.5 percent for each subsequent year served (Age and 
Service Requirements, 2006). The maximum amount is 100 percent commensurate with 
40 years of service but only occurs in rare cases for senior general officers and senior 
enlisted Marines (National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA], 2007).  
In addition to the compensation stipulated above, military retired pay is protected 
against inflation through the use of cost of living adjustments (COLA).  The COLA is 
subsidized by the government, per 10 U.S.C. Section 1401a, and augments retired 
military pay. Eligible retirees may also begin drawing social security benefits as early as 
age 62. 
2. The Thrift Savings Plan 
The Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 extended the defined 
contribution, or Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), to military members. The TSP allows military 
members to invest all or a portion of their basic pay into a mix of funds with varying risk 
levels. While the TSP offers investors more hands-on control over their retirement 
planning, Lusardi et al. (2012) determined that most retirees lack the financial 
sophistication to be able to make decisions regarding the management of defined-
contribution plans. 
3. Indirect Compensation 
Retirees can choose to live in any of the 24 states that exempt military retirement 
income from state tax. In a worst-case scenario, such as California, income tax can 
impose as much as a 9.3 percent annual burden on the retiree. There are several states that 
offer a partial tax benefit the military retirees. Retirees under the age of 65 are eligible for 
Standard TRICARE with no extra cost. Additionally, those retirees over 65 are 
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automatically enrolled in TRICARE for Life, which covers eligible non-Medicare 
expenses. The combined benefits offered through TRICARE and Veterans’ Affairs 
healthcare make more than half of the deferred compensation retirees receive. 
4. Sanctuary Protection 
Paragraph 12646 of Title 10 U.S.C. addresses the retention of active duty officers 
who have accrued at least 18 but fewer than 20 years of service. These officers are within 
two years of retirement eligibility and are considered to be in a sanctuary status.  They 
may not be involuntarily separated until retirement eligibility is reached. The sanctuary 
status does not guarantee promotions, promotion eligibility, or the opportunity to serve 
beyond 20 years (HQMC M&RA, 2012). 
D. USMC MANPOWER REDUCTIONS GOALS 
The Marine Corps is seeking to reduce its end strength by 20,000 Marines by 
fiscal year 2016.  It has proposed temporary early retirement authority (TERA), voluntary 
separation pay (VSP), enlisted retention, and Officer Continuation Boards, as well as a 
reduction in promotion opportunities as the parameters to reduce its end strength.  The 
parameters will be implemented in series and aggregated until the desired end strength is 
achieved.  The Marine Corps drawdown plan will result in an overall 10 percent 
reduction in its officer corps with a majority of those coming from the company grade 
and field grade ranks (HQMC M&RA, 2012). 
1. Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) 
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2012 reauthorized service 
components to offer early retirement to its active duty members who have completed at 
least 15 years of active service but fewer than 20 years. This authority is enacted at the 
discretion of the service components and is not an entitlement to service members 
(NDAA, 2012). TERA retired pay is computed using the same formula that is used for 
conventional 20 year retirements, but it includes an early retirement reduction factor 
based on the number of months the member retires with fewer than 20 years of service 
 TERA Retired = High-3 Active Duty Pay x Percent Multiple x Reduction Factor  
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 Reduction Factor = 1/12th of 1% for each month retired early 
2. Voluntary Separation Pay (VSP) 
In addition to TERA, the 2012 NDAA authorized service components to offer 
VSP to its active duty member. Each service component secretary will determine the 
amount of compensation members will be paid under this program (1175 10 U.S.C., 
2006).  Under the purview of the Secretary of the Navy, the Marine Corps has established 
the program for active duty officers who hold or have been selected for promotion to the 
rank of major.  Eligible officers must have completed at least 6 years of active service but 
fewer than 20 (HQMC M&RA, 2012). VSP provides a lump-sum monetary payment to 
eligible officers who voluntarily separate from active duty and will be computed by the 
formula below: 
 VSP = 0.20 x Year of Active Service x Annual Basic Pay  
3. Officer Continuation Boards 
The final measure for the Marine Corps’ drawdown plan for the officer population 
is the continuation board. Each year upon the completion of the officer promotion boards, 
the boards will reconvene to consider the continued service of captains and majors who 
have been twice passed over for selection to the next grade (HQMC M&RA, 2012).  The 
major continuation board considers those officers who are subject to involuntary 
discharge and will have fewer than 18 years of service (HQMC M&RA, 2012). The 
captain continuation board considers prior enlisted captains who have at least 15 years of 
active service but fewer than 18 years of active service (HQMC M&RA, 2012). Those 
officers selected for continuation will serve on active duty until they achieve 20 years of 
active service and will be retired (HQMC M&RA, 2012). Those not selected for 






Years of Prior Active Service 6
Age at Commissioning 26
Natural Retirement Age 59
Natural Life Age 74
Inflation Rate 3.0%
Interest 8.0%
Replacement Ratio at Retirement 70.0%
Initial Retirement Savings $5,000
Terminal Wealth Goal $0
Input Data
III. MODEL FORMULATION 
A. OVERVIEW 
The model was created using Microsoft Excel and the Risk Simulator add-in from 
Real Options Valuation, Inc.  Before the effects of the Marine Corps’ drawdown 
parameters were assessed, a baseline career probability was derived to determine what 
the attrition rates were for the affected population.  The model assumes that the career 
designation process has occurred.  It has historically coincided with or been predicated on 
promotion to the rank of captain. 
B. INPUTS 
The parameters for the model’s input are shown Figure 2. The inputs for were the 
Marines accession date, starting grade, years of prior active service, age, and the 
drawdown parameters implemented by the Marine Corps.  
Figure 2.  Model Input Variables 
1. Date Commissioned 
While most Marine officer are accessed as second lieutenants, officers who were 
commissioned with more than four years of active service as an enlisted Marine have a 
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higher base pay as a company grade officer.  The “Date Commissioned” is the date that 
the Marine was accessed into the officer corps.  This variable does not take into account 
prior service years. 
2. Starting Grade  
 The “Starting Grade” is the initial rank to which the officer was commissioned. 
In line with assumptions described below, the only available options for the model are O1 
or O1E.  Officers with fewer than four years of prior active service will select O1.  
Officers with four or more years of active service will select O1E and enter the 
appropriate number of prior service years in the next variable.   
3. Years of Prior Active Service 
The officer will enter the total number of creditable years of active service 
completed prior to the date of commissioning. The “Years of Prior Active Service” is 
used with commissioning date and starting grade to determine the “Starting Base Pay” in 
the model’s output.  If a starting grade of O1E is chosen, the officer will enter at least 
4 for this variable to calculate the proper starting base pay. 
4. Ages 
The “Age at Commissioning” is the officer’s age in years on the date of 
commissioning.  The “Natural Retirement Age” is the age beyond military retirement age 
to which the officer will continue to work. Together these ages are used to compute the 
investment contribution level necessary to fund the simulated retirement until “Natural 
Life Age” or terminal age.   
5. Inflation and Interest Rates 
For each iteration of the simulation, the model will choose an expected inflation 
rate and rate of return for investments from a normally distributed sample of rates.  These 
rates will be used to adjust the forecasted income and investment earnings during the 
periodic payment.  Investing strategy was beyond the scope of this study.  The standard 
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deviations of the normal distributions provide a measure of volatility in the forecasted 
earnings to prevent deterministic forecasting of investment outcomes. 
6. Replacement Ratio at Retirement 
The “Replacement Ratio at Retirement” variable represents the percentage of 
monthly working income that will be needed to maintain the desired standard of living in 
the retirement years.  This ratio is used to pay for taxes, living expenses, and 
discretionary spending.  This percentage will be taken from the highest monthly income 
before retirement and withdrawn, inflation adjusted, from the accumulated retirement 
savings each month. 
7. Initial Retirement Savings  
“Initial Retirement Savings” is the amount of money that the officer has 
accumulated prior to being commissioned and will be applied toward retirement 
investments.  This can be adjusted depending on the career starting point of the 
simulation. It is currently defaulted to coincide with savings accumulated on the 
accession date.  
8. Terminal Wealth Goal 
  The “Terminal Wealth Goal’ is the amount of money that the officer desires to 
be left over at the terminal age.  This will be used to determine the contribution rate 
necessary to make the Terminal Wealth in the model’s output equal to this amount.   
C. OUTPUTS 
The pertinent outputs of the model are the estimated career longevity, monthly 
contribution rate, discharge age, and forecasted VSP compensation. The outputs of the 
simulation are shown in Figure 3 below.  The output variables not highlighted were used 
only for intermediate computational purposes and were not analyzed in Chapter IV. The 
yellow-highlighted regions will generate a distribution of the simulated results that will 
be analyzed in Chapter IV.   
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Figure 3.  Simulation Results 
1. Starting Base Pay  
Given the officer accession date, starting grade, and years of prior service, the 
model performs a lookup of the 1996 pay table. Pay increases from 1996 until the 
accession year are added to this amount and the base pay for the initial pay grade and 
years of service is returned.  The same lookup is performed during the career simulation 
to ensure the correct pay is accumulated each month, accounting for promotions. 
2. Contribution Ratio and Amount 
The “Contribution Ratio” is the percentage of the monthly pay that the officer 
needs to invest each month in order to reach the desired retirement wealth goal. The 
Excel Goal Seek function is used to return the appropriate percentage.  This percentage is 
multiplied by the officer’s initial base pay to determine the contribution amount. 
3.  Net Career Military Salary  
The “Net Career Military Salary” variable returned the expected aggregate career 
salary.  It was solely determined by the accumulated base pay and did not include 
entitlements and allowances.  
Starting Base Pay $2,572
Contribution Ratio 24.9% 24.9%
Net Career Military Salary $2,533,907
Miliary Career Length 24.3
Military Discharge Age 44
Contribution Amount $640
Terminal Wealth $986,583
Hi Three Base Pay $4,814
Retirement Multiplier 60.9%
Max Base Pay $4,843
Max Monthly Salary $6,413
VSP Amount $0




4. Military Career Length  
The “Military Career Length” variable created a distribution of the career 
longevity, in years, for each iteration of the simulation.  It was measured by adding the 
years of prior active service to the years of commissioned service. This was used to 
distinguish which drawdown parameter the officer will be subject to.  Officers with 20 or 
more years of service were eligible for military retirement.  Majors with fewer than 
20 years of service were eligible for VSP.   Officers with fewer than 20 but more than 
15 years of service were eligible for TERA. 
5. Military Discharge Age  
The “Military Discharge Age” variable returned the simulated age at discharge. It 
was computed by adding the years of commissioned service to the accession age. The 
variable created a distribution of the discharge ages, in years, for each iteration of the 
simulation.  This variable was used to determine the age to begin adjusting the income 
level during the working years from military compensation to civilian compensation. 
6. Terminal Wealth  
The “Terminal Wealth” variable returned the expected wealth at the terminal age.  
The Goal Seek function will attempt to force this amount to be equal to the terminal 
wealth goal from the input and return the necessary contribution rate.  It is based on 
investment growth during the working years and consumption during the retired years.  A 
positive or zero value is acceptable.  A negative value is indicative of an underfunded 
retirement.   
7. Hi Three Base Pay  
If the officer is retirement eligible during the simulation run by accruing at least 
20 years of total service, the model will return the average of the highest three months of 
base pay.  The model returns zero otherwise.  A portion of this amount, determined by 
the multiplier, will be accumulated each month as income in the retired years until the 
terminal age is reached. 
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8. Retirement Multiplier  
The models returns the appropriate multiplier based on years of service. This is 
computed as 2.5 multiplied by the total number of years of active service for officers who 
have at least 20 years of service.  
9. Max Base Pay 
The model returns the maximum monthly salary earned during the active military 
career.  This is used to compute the VSP amount if the officer is eligible. 
10. Max Monthly Salary  
The model returns the highest overall salary earned before retirement. A portion 
of this amount, determined by the replacement ratio, will be withdrawn each month 
during the retired years to account for monthly expenses and discretionary spending.  
11. VSP Amount 
If the officer’s final rank before discharge is major (O4) and the officer has fewer 
than 15 but more than six years of service, the model returns the amount of VSP 
authorized. The model returns zero otherwise 
12. TERA Hi Three Base Pay  
Officers who have accrued at least 15 years but fewer than 20 years of active 
service will be eligible for TERA.  If the officer is eligible, the model returns the amount 
of TERA authorized if eligible based on the statutory high three determination with a 
reduction factor included. The model returns zero otherwise 
13. Sanctuary Years  
If the simulation returns career longevity between 18 and 20 years, the model 
returns the number of years needed to reach 20 years.  This amount is added to time in 
grade of last pay grade in the simulated career.  
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D. ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Staff Judge Advocate 
This model assumes that all Marine Corps officers are accessed as second 
lieutenants and follow the same linear career path.  Officers accessed through the Marine 
Corp law programs are accessed as second lieutenants, but have the opportunity to 
advance their time in service and seniority for promotion while completing their law 
school education. It was determined from the initial TFDW queries that this deviation 
from the normal career progression for this community represents a small number of the 
total population of officers accessed.  However, the length of time that is spent 
completing the law school requirements in an inactive status will significantly affect their 
modeled career paths and earnings.  This population was, therefore, excluded from the 
sample population. This excluded subpopulation comprised those second lieutenants with 
the military occupational specialty (MOS) Judge Advocate, designated with a value of 
“4401” or “4402” in the “PRIMARY_MOS” data field.  
2. Limited Duty Officers 
Limited duty officers (LDO) are restricted line officers who are accessed  
from the warrant officer community.  Their commissioning track begins at the  
rank of Captain (O3E).  LDO are rarely, if ever, discharged from the Marine Corps prior 
to achieving retirement eligibility due to the prior enlisted service and time as a  
warrant officer. While the study may have been pertinent to the LDO community,  
LDOs were excluded from the sample population. This excluded subpopulation  
was designated as those second commissioned officers with a non-null value in the 
“DATE_RANK_LDO_1ST_COMMISSION” data field in the TFDW query. 
3. Present Value 
This model assumed the initial commissioning as a second lieutenant as the 
starting point for all officers to consider their retirement plan. While Marines may 
consider their career longevity and retirement planning at different points in their career, 
having a similar starting point facilitates comparison in the analysis. Similarly, since the 
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value of money will change over time and the longevity of the modeled careers will 
differ, all monies will be expressed as present value (PV) sums to facilitate comparisons 
of careers with different time horizons. 
4. Allowances 
Marines receive entitlements such as Basic Allowance for Subsistence and Basic 
Allowance for Housing.  These entitlements are quite sizable and vary based on the 
Marine’s location, grade, and dependent status.  For this study it was assumed that 
Marines will use their entitlements for the purposes for which they were intended and 
will not be counted as income that could be invested for retirement. 
5. Negative Career Progression 
The career profiles modeled in this study assume a non-negative career 
progression.  While there may actual instances of demotions within the population, it is 
assumed that the total number of negative career progressions is not large enough 
compared to the number of officers in the affected population.   
6. Career Designation 
The purpose of this study is to determine the effects of the Marine Corps 
drawdown on the population of career-intentioned officers.  The assumption is that the 
officers modeled in the study have already been offered and have accepted career 
designation. The purpose of career designation as well as its process has been discussed 
as it relates to officer attrition.  Career designation will not be modeled as a part of this 
study. 
E. BASELINE CAREER STATISTICS 
Before the outputs of the theoretical model could be validated, an understanding 
of the current and historical career flows was correlated with the model’s career flow 
outputs.  Each fiscal year, the Marine Corps provides inputs into the DoD’s annual 
Defense Manpower Requirement Report (DMMR).  The report shows the officer flows 
for the previous and current fiscal years, and forecasts out the manpower flows for five 
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fiscal years.  The average manpower flows for each grade O1 thorough O6 fiscal years 
1996 through 2013 were observed to determine the actual number of officers who were 
involuntarily separated. Since the beginning of FY2004 both voluntary separations and 
involuntary paid separations were combined and reported as one number for each grade.  
The precise number of officers who were involuntarily separated could not be 
derived from the data provided by the DMMR. A query of the TFDW was used to 
determine the numbers of officers in each grade who were released from active duty 
involuntarily. The baseline was evaluated prior to conducting the analysis. 
F. PROMOTION PROFILE 
All policies within the DoD regarding the promotion of active duty officers are 
governed by Title 10 of the United States Code. Section 523 of the law determines the 
number of officers in each grade below the rank of brigadier general as well as the 
aggregate number of officers allowed. The Manpower Plans and Policy (MPP) division 
of Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) establishes the manning levels for each grade 
each fiscal year.  The Marine Corps policy for officer promotions is to "promote the best 
and most fully qualified” from all promotion-eligible officers in a given rank without 
regard to primary military occupational specialty (CMC, 2001). The career designation 
process ensures that manning levels for each PMOS are adequate (CMC, 2001). While 
this approach has led to some periodic shortfalls in some PMOSs (McHugh et al., 2006), 
it ensures that promotion probabilities are not a function of PMOS.  Since this study 
assumes that officers in the affected population have been offered and accepted career 
designation, PMOS is not necessary and will not be used in this study to determine 
promotion probability.  
1. Promotion Probabilities 
Table 2 shows the Marine Corps officer promotion statistics from fiscal year 1993 
to 2013. The promotion rates have been close to these averages since the early 1990s. 
Adjustments for increases or decreases to the manning levels for each grade are achieved 
by altering the time in grade requirement for eligible officers that a promotion board will 
consider.  
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Table 2.   Average Promotion Statistics FY1993–FY2013 

























Col  2.8%  51.0%  0.0%  5.6  5.6  0.0  22.0  22.0  22.0  44.8  43.7  0.0 
LtCol  5.1%  67.1%  0.0%  6.5  4.6  3.6  16.6  15.4  27.6  40.0  38.4  46.8 
Maj  2.9%  84.5%  0.5%  5.6  4.5  3.4  11.3  10.8  11.5  34.7  33.7  34.5 
Capt  1.1%  98.4%  0.0%  2.8  1.4  0.0  6.1  4.8  0.0  29.6  27.8  0.0 
 
Based on the promotion probabilities extracted above, a probability tree was 
generated for a newly commissioned second lieutenant (see Appendix A). A sampling of 
the available promotion probability statistics from 1993–2013 was used to determine the 
promotion probability at each grade as well as the average time in grade that a Marine 
served until selected for promotion. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used in the Risk 
Simulator, and the data points for each grade were evaluated to determine the best 
distributional fit of the sampled data.  The chosen distributions and their associated 
parameters are shown in Table 3 and Table 4.   
Table 3.   Distributional Fit of Promotion Probabilities (1993–2013) 
Promotion To  Probability of Promotion  Fitted Distribution (Parameters)  Parameter 1  Parameter 2  Parameter 3 
1stLt  100.00%  Uniform (Max,Min)  1.0000  1.0000    
Capt In Zone  96.16%  Power 3 (Location,Factor Alpha)  0.0000  1.0000  24.0718 
Capt Above Zone  0.04%  Lognormal (Mean,Deviation)  0.0102  0.0153    
Maj In Zone  78.53%  Gumbel Minimum (Alpha,Beta)  0.8495  0.0543    
Maj Above Zone  0.81%  Lognormal (Mean,Deviation)  0.0436  0.0360    
LtCol In Zone  51.71%  Gamma (Alpha,Beta)  4.7349  0.0089    
LtCol Above Zone  1.15%  Gumbel Minimum (Alpha,Beta)  0.6718  0.0339    
Col In Zone  26.64%  Uniform (Min,Max)  0.4720  0.5360    









Table 4.   Distributional Fit of Time in Grade (Years) (1993–2013) 
Promotion To  Time in Grade (Years)  Fitted Distribution (Parameters)  Parameter 1  Parameter 2  Parameter 3 
1stLt  2.0  Uniform (Max,Min)  2.0000  2.0000    
Capt In Zone  1.4  Gumbel Minimum (Alpha,Beta)  1.5481  0.3952    
Capt Above Zone  2.6  Logistic (Alpha,Beta)  2.6104  0.2473    
Maj In Zone  4.8  Lognormal (Mean,Deviation)  4.6910  0.4396    
Maj Above Zone  5.8  Lognormal 3 (Shift, Mean,Deviation)  5.7638  0.5369  0.1121 
LtCol In Zone  4.5  Lognormal 3 (Shift, Mean,Deviation)  4.5394  0.2472  0.0695 
LtCol Above Zone  6.1  Logistic (Alpha,Beta)  6.1059  0.3168    
Col In Zone  5.6  Triangluar (Min,MostLikely,Max)  4.0651  4.2200  4.7000 
Col Above Zone  5.6  Lognormal 3 (Shift, Mean,Deviation)  5.5553  0.2631  0.0578 
 
While the promotion and time in grade rates over the sampled 20-year period 
were fairly steady, there was variance in their values. Using just the average promotion 
rate for a given rank would lead to deterministic forecasting that does not account for the 
variance in the values (Mun, 2006, p. 318).  A dynamic sampling of the promotion 
opportunities will be used to account for the variance in probabilities and yield a greater 
confidence in the validity models outputs.  The result of this method yielded a 
distribution of expected outcome from which a confidence interval could be chosen to 
suit individual preferences.  
2. Career Simulation Model 
With the sample career statistics described above, a career simulation model was 
created in Excel.  The career path simulation model is shown in Figure 4 and is explained 
for each area of the model. The fitted distributions were used to simulate both career 
longevity as well as the likelihood of promotion throughout a career using Monte Carlo 
simulation.  The simulation was randomly seeded and run for 6,000 iterations. Two 
separate simulations were run. The first was for an O1, 22 years old, with no previous 
service.  The second was for an O1E, 24 years old, with 6 years of prior service. All other 
inputs remained the same. It was necessary to create two separate runs because O1s and 
O1Es have different career starting points in terms of initial pay and years of service. The 
breakdown for each drawdown parameter for simulated careers that fall short of a 20-year 
retirement will be reviewed in the analysis. 
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Figure 4.  Career Longevity Simulation Model 
a. Section 1: Initial Accession 
Officers commissioned as second lieutenants are automatically selected 
for promotion to first lieutenant with promotion effective after two years of time in grade, 
with good service (CMC, 2001).  They are modeled with 100 percent promotion for all 
simulation runs and automatically credited two years of service for career longevity. 
Career path uncertainty begins with selection for promotion to captain.   
b. Section 2: Career Uncertainty 
 For each run of the simulation, a promotion probability was randomly 
sampled from the distributions chosen above for each grade and selection zone O3/O3E 
through O6.  Section 1 and Section 2 are essentially the promotion probability tree in 
tabular form. 
c. Section 3: Promotion Zones 
An officer has two opportunities to be selected for promotion before being 
passed over twice. After being twice passed for promotion, an officer will normally be 
discharged from active duty at the first available opportunity either by involuntary 
separation or mandatory retirement, if eligible. This section models the in-zone and 
above-zone promotion opportunities using a Bernoulli distribution to represent success 
and failure. The sampled in-zone and above-zone promotion probabilities were used as 
the success probability in the distribution. Successful promotions were represented as 
binary 1 and failure as binary 0.  
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d. Section 4: Linked Promotions  
This section ensures continuity of promotion of O1E to O3E or O1 to O3. 
It ensures that a simulated promotion is only effective if the officer has been promoted to 
all previous grades as well. Additionally, it checks to ensure in-zone promotions are 
credited as successful before above-zone promotions in the same grade. 
e. Section 5: Time in Grade 
This section takes a random sample from the time in grade distribution for 
the successful promotions and credits those sampled years in Section 6 if the promotion 
was effective.  Analysis between time in grade and selection rate showed little correlation 
between the two variables for in-zone and above-zone promotions.  
f. Section 6: Career Simulation 
The time in grade for each promotion is credited in this section.  If the 
officer has accumulated at least 18 years of service but fewer than 20 years, the officer 
will also be credited with the years of sanctuary in the grade to which the officer was last 
promoted. 
g. Section 7: Commissioned Longevity 
The career longevity was determined by taking the sum of sampled times 
in grade for effective promotions and adding it to the previous years of service from the 
model input.  Careers that extend beyond 20 years are eligible for retirement. Careers that 
extend beyond 15 years but fewer than 20 are eligible for temporary early retirement.  
Officers who hold the rank or select rank of major with at least six years of active duty 
are eligible for voluntary separation pay.  Captains and majors who are twice passed over 
must be selected for continuation to achieve 20 years of service.  
G. CAREER COMPENSATION MODEL 
1. Pay Increases 
Once the career longevity profile was simulated, the career pay was determined. 
The basic pay used in the model was computed from the historic pay tables from the 
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Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).  The historic and known pay increases 
from 1965 to 2017 were analyzed and fitted to forecast the pay increases for the future 
years beyond 2017. Multiple possible trendlines were examined and the exponential 
trendline shown in Figure 5 was chosen.   
The 53 periods represented in Figure 5 are the actual data points from 1965 to 
2017. The exponential trendline had the highest R-squared value, 0.5291, of all the 
nonlinear trendlines. The linear trendlines were discounted because they allowed negative 
pay increases, which was inconsistent with all of the historical data points. The trend 
analysis also forecasted the pay increases out for an additional 20 years to 2037. While it 
was acknowledged that forecasting beyond five years was ambitious, it was an 
assumption that allowed for the career pay of those officers whose simulated  
careers extended beyond 2017 to be modeled with a reasonable level of confidence.  The 
fitted and forecasted pay increases from which the trendline is based are available in 
Appendix B.  
 
Figure 5.  Actual and Forecasted Pay Increases (1965–2017)  
2. Career Pay 
The total career compensation is equal the sum of the monthly base pay for all 
months in grade for each grade held.  
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The basic pay is subject to change at the beginning of each calendar year due to 
annual pay increases as well with promotions to higher grades.  A lookup table was used 
to determine the initial basic pay based on the officer’s initial grade, OE or O1E, and 
accession year from the model’s input section. The 1996 pay table was chosen as the 
initial starting point for all base pay determinations with the assumption that all officers 
who were accessed prior to 1996, still on active duty, will have the requisite number of 
years to be eligible for retirement benefits or be eligible for sanctuary status. They 
therefore would not be affected by the Marine Corps current drawdown parameters. A 
lookup function was executed using the officer’s initial pay grade and years of service. 
The sum of all pay increases from 1996 to the officer’s accession year was used to 
determine the initial base pay as well as all monthly pay during the simulated career.  
H. INVESTMENT MODEL  
The investment model uses the goal seek function to retroactively determine the 
monthly percentage and monthly contribution needed for an officer to meet retirement 
wealth goals based on the outcome of the simulated military career. It takes as its input 
the Marine’s initial retirement savings, the nominal inflation rate, the desired rate of 
return on investments, terminal wealth goal, and income replacement ratio. A terminal 
wealth goal was assumed to be zero for both simulation runs, meaning the officer will 
have consumed the entirety of accumulated wealth in the retired years.   
During the simulated career, if the Marine is determined to be within the affected 
population of career-designated officers, he or she will be discharged as the result of one 
of the drawdown parameters. Those that are not selected for continuation may be eligible 
to receive some compensation, either VSP or TERA benefits. Since these Marines have 
not reached the natural retirement age, the assumption is that this compensation will be 
used to fund their retirement investments or as replacement income.  
Because the simulated careers will have different time horizons, income and 
wealth projections will have different relative values because of the time value of money 
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The net present value (NPV) measures the value of future dollars in current dollars 
(Cook, 2013). The use of the NPV allows for a reasonable comparison of different 
investment simulation iterations that have different time horizons. The NPV accounts for 
the risk that is expressed as the discounted rate.  While the discount rate may not be 
precisely correct year to year for every investment, it is the generally accepted measure 
for forecasting the value of future dollars and provides consistency when comparing 
investment with similar risk exposure (Cook, 2013). The NPV is expressed as the sum of 
all cash flows, ܴ௧, discounted by the given rate, ࢏, at period, ࢚ , for all periods (Cook, 
2013): 




All wealth forecasts were expressed in terms of the NPV.  The investment periods 
varied based on the difference between the Marine’s expected military retirement age and 
the natural retirement age of 62.  All credited military active duty and retirement 
payments were recorded in actual dollars since they were already adjusted for inflation. 
I. POST–MILITARY CAREER INCOME 
The career longevity from career simulation is used to determine the Marine’s age 
at time of discharge from the military. Once the Marine has completed his or her military 
career, the assumption was made based on previous studies that the Marine will continue 
to work until the natural retirement age.  The age chosen for the model was 62, the age at 
which 95 percent of workers leave the workforce and permanently retire (Maestas, 2009). 
This age is also an input to the model that can be adjusted to fit the Marine’s preferences.  
The income accrued during a post–military career will be assumed to be the 
equivalent civilian income necessary to maintain, at a minimum, the same standard of 
living afforded by the military income. 
J. RETIREMENT MODEL 
A payout table was generated to capture the monthly income, investments, 
withdrawals, and net accumulated wealth after each iteration in the simulation.  The 
payout table is broken into three distinct areas.  
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The active duty working years, labeled as “Military,” covered all periods of 
projected military service. The income earned during the active duty years is based on 
military base pay only.  The model will invest a portion to fund the officer’s retirement.   
The nonactive duty working years, labeled as “Working,” covered the time period 
between the end of military service and the beginning of natural retirement. The income 
earned in the nonactive duty years was a portion of the officer’s active duty pay 
determined by the income replacement ratio.  The amount depended on whether the 
officer earned retirement eligibility.  
The retired years, labeled as “Retired,” are the remaining years from the natural 
retirement age to the terminal age.  No money was earned during this period, unless the 
Marine reached retirement eligibility. The amount of money withdrawn from retirement 
savings was the percentage of retirement income replacement of the highest monthly pay 
earned in the nonactive duty working years, typically the last working month. The 
replacement ratio chosen for this simulation was 70 percent. 
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A. MODEL VALIDITY 
Before the results of the model were analyzed, an association was drawn between 
the career longevity of the theoretical results from the model’s output and the actual 
career longevity of a random sample population of officers from TFDW.  The officers 
within the sample population that met the same criteria of officers that were excluded 
from the model based on the assumptions were also excluded from the queried sample.    
The model simulates career paths for careers that span the years from 1996 
through 2037, inclusively. Simulations of career paths that included years from 1996 to 
2013 were based on promotion probabilities from a known year’s data, while simulations 
that included years from 2014 to 2037 were theoretical. To determine the validity of the 
model’s theoretically forecasted outputs, simulations were run for the career paths of 
second lieutenants who began their careers in 1996 and compared with the TFDW 
queries of the actual career paths of second lieutenants who began their careers in 1996. 
A strong correlation between the known career paths and modeled career paths would 
provide confidence in the model’s validity. 
The comparisons are shown in Table 5 and described below.  The TFDW query is 
based on the number of officers accessed during FY1996.  The initial model simulation 
was run for 6,000 iterations for the accession of a second lieutenant, O1 in 1996.  
In all, the Marine Corps accessed 1,149 second lieutenants during fiscal year 
1996, per the TFDW query of FY1996 quarterly sequence numbers. Of those, 955, or 
83 percent, were offered career designation from which 47 declined to accept. The 
overall acceptance rate was 95 percent. 
 The career paths of those FY1996 officers who accepted career designation were 
followed by querying promotion and discharge entries for the subsequent TFDW 
sequence numbers up to FY2013.  All officers were either discharged or currently remain 
on active duty.  Of those accessed, 20 percent remain on active duty, all at the rank of 
lieutenant colonel (O5) with an average of 17.40 years of service.  The remaining 80 
percent have all been discharged by either separation or retirement.  Of those, 44 percent 
 34
served to the rank of major with 10.14 years of commissioned service, 83 percent served 
to the rank of captain with 4.06 years of service, and 96 percent served up to the rank of 
first lieutenant with 2.00 years of service. A total of 51 second lieutenants were 
discharged prior to being promoted to first lieutenant for physical disability or other 
administrative reasons.   
The model assumes that each officer has accepted career designation and does not 
consider the officers who were discharged voluntarily before career designation or as a 
result of the career designation process.  The promotion probabilities used in this study 
are reflective of those officers who desired continued service to reach retirement 
eligibility. The career paths of officers who separated voluntarily prior to achieving 
retirement eligibility were not considered. 
After promotion to O4, the percentage of officers promoted begins to vary 
increasingly between the TFDW queried data and the model’s output. The model 
assumes that a Marine officer will desire to continue service even after achieving 
retirement eligibility.  In reality, there will be a sharp increase in the number of officers 
that will choose to retire upon reaching retirement eligibility.  The higher promotion rates 
in the modeled data reflect the promotions of those officers who remain on active duty 
after achieving retirement eligibility. 
Based on the comparison of the model output for the known year’s data and an 
understanding of the variances due to voluntary attrition, the model was used to make 
determinations for the forecasted years beyond 2013. 
Table 5.   TFDW Model Comparison FY1996 Accessions 
 
Grade Years of Service % Promoted Years of Service % Promoted
O1 0.00 95.04% 0 100%
O2 2.00 96.24% 2.0 96.16%
O3 4.06 82.71% 4.61 78.53%
O4 10.19 44.24% 10.42 51.71%
O5 16.69 20.40% 16.54 26.64%






B. CAREER LONGEVITY 
As previously mentioned, it was necessary to distinguish between the career paths 
of O1 and O1E second lieutenants for the analysis because they will have different career 
staring points in terms of initial pay and years of service.  The O1 was modeled with a 
starting age of 22 and no prior active service.  The O1E was modeled with a starting age 
of 24 with six years of prior active service.  The date of accession for both was 1 January 
2000.  The modeled career longevity for both career paths is shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6.  Modeled Career Longevity 
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The result was a multinode normal disrtibution for both career paths.  The nodes 
corresponded with an officer being twice passed over for selection to the next grade. 
Each node is representative of a grade beginning with promotion to O3, which was the 
start of promotion uncertainty. The output is placed in three categories: Category A, the 
probabilitay of serving fewer than 15 years; Category B, the probability of serving more 
than 15 years and fewer than 18 years;  and Category C, the probability of serving more 
than 18 years.  Although 20 years of service is the requirement for retirement eligibility, 
those that reach sanctuary at 18 years were modeled with the appropriate number of years 
to achieve 20 years of service in their final grade and were counted with those that 
achieved retirement eligibity without sanctuary. 
A large spike was observed in the O1 career path at the 20-year mark.  This was 
interepreted as the number of Marines who reach sanctuary and were extended to 
20 years to achieve retirement eligibility.  The actual number will be higher since a larger 
number of officers will choose to retire upon reaching retirement eligibility as indicated 
by the TFDW query of actual career paths. 
There were roughly 6.9 percent of the O1s expected to be discharged in Category 
A with an avergage of 10.6 years of service.  This is comparable to 6.7 percent of the 
O1Es who were expected to serve 11.1 years.  For the career paths, 10.4 percent of the 
O1s were category B with 15.2 years of service, and 10.3 percent of the O1Es were 
category B with 15.1 years of service.  The remaining reached retirement eligibility.  
1. Discharge Age 
The modeled output and percentages for the discharge age shown in Figure 7 are 
similar to the output for longevity.  This intuitively follows because the discharge age is 
function of the career longevity.  This discharge age is important however when 
considering time horizon and the contribution level needed to fund the retirement. The 
O1s in category A were separated with an average age of 27.8 years compared to 29.8 for 
O1Es.  The O1s and O1Es in Category B were discharged with an average age of 
37.5 years and 35.5 years, respectively.  The retirement eligible age began at 41.3 years 







Figure 7.  Modeled Discharge Age 
C. MONTHLY CONTRIBUTION 
1. Baseline Contribution 
Both career path results from the simulation showed similarities with the expected 
contribution percentages an officer should make to successfully fund retirement. As 







Figure 8.  Baseline Monthly Contribution Rate  
For the O1E career path, roughly 80 percent of the 6,000 iterations normalized 
around 8.1 percent while the remaining 20 percent normalized around 23.2 percent 
contribution rate.  The O1 career path also had a bimodal distribution. However just 
under two-thirds of the iterations normalized around the higher 23 percent contribution 
rate and one-third around 9.8 percent.  The lower contribution rates for both career paths 
correspond with officers achieving retirement eligibility and the benefit of expected 
retirement compensation. 
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The higher rates are associated with officers who were discharged with no 
retirement benefits and thus required a higher level of contribution during their working 
years to achieve the same terminal retirement goal.  Because of the disparity in the 
contribution percentages between the two career paths, it was concluded that O1Es reach 
retirement eligibility at a higher rate.  This follows intuitively as well because of the 
initial boost to their longevity provided by their years of previous service. Therefore, O1s 
should contribute at a higher rate earlier in their careers to increase the likelihood of 
funding their retirements and make reasonable adjustments through their careers as the 
uncertainty is reduced. 
2. TERA Impact 
To determine the effect of an officer accepting early retirement on the officer’s 
ability to fund retirement, the model was run with the same parameters as the baseline.  
For this simulation, however, the retirement pay was computed using the TERA 
computation for those eligible officers in Category B and compared to the Category A 
and Category C officers.  
With the TERA allowed as an option in the model, a dramatic shift in the 
contribution rate for both O1s and O1Es was apparent. The results, depicted in Figure 9, 
show a shift from 37 percent to nearly 50 percent of the O1s expected to be able to fund 
their retirement with TERA benefits. Nearly 92 percent of all of the O1E iterations were 
expected to be able to fund their retirement at the lower contribution rate compared to 








Figure 9.  Contribution Rate with TERA Option 
3. VSP Contribution Rate 
To determine the effect of accepting VSP on an officer’s ability to fund 
retirement, the model was run with the same parameters as the baseline.  For this 
simulation, only discharges that were the result of separation with entitlement to VSP 
were observed. The VSP payment was added to the investment contribution at the time of 
separation.  
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There were a number of O1s that were eligible for the VSP benefit.  Figure 10 
shows that only 246 of the 6,000 iterations, or 4.1 percent, registered eligibility for VSP 
contribution.  The amount of the contribution was normally distributed and centered on 
$158,000.  The mean contribution rate with the VSP benefit was reduced from the 
23.2 percent baseline to 6.2 percent. This is slightly less than the contribution rate for the 
officers that were eligible for retirement. 
 




With the VSP option active, there were no iterations of O1Es that were eligible 
for the benefit.  The model input for O1E included a conservative estimate of 6 years of 
prior active service. The requirement for the VSP is promotion or selection to O4.  The 
model only adds time in service for a simulated promotion. The model does not allow for 
intermediate accumulation of time in service for periods before actual promotion. These 
periods of time are less discrete and difficult to model because each individual Marine 
will serve different periods of time while waiting to be promoted.  
In reality there may be O1E career path officers that qualify for the benefit while 
waiting to be selected for promotion to major.  The significance of the results was that 
that number will be at a much less rate than the 4.1 percent produced for O1 career path 
officers. This indicated that O1Es will be eligible for either TERA or statutory retirement 








The Marine Corps plans to decrease its overall end strength by nearly 20,000 
Marines by fiscal year 2016.  This reduction will affect the careers all communities 
within the Marine Corps.  This study focused on modeling the retirement and wealth 
probability of career-designated active duty officers because their career paths are the 
most linear of all populations. Even though this study only modeled one population of 
Marines, it has application to the others that will be affected.  
A baseline career path distribution of career-designated officer was sampled from 
existing historical data from TFDW. The TFDW does not have the ability to readily 
query the actual career pay and entitlements earned by the affected population.  The basic 
monthly pay for each grade was compiled from historical pay charts. A distributional fit 
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was conducted.  The historical promotion and 
probability statistics for each grade was compiled for historical promotion data and a 
distributional fit was applied.  
During each simulation run, random samples from the fitted distributions were 
chosen for each input parameter to develop a career profile.  The career profile 
considered promotions for each grade where the officer met the requisite time in grade 
requirements. The predicted monthly contribution was computed based on the simulated 
career path longevity.  The simulation was run for 6,000 iterations. The outputs of the 
simulation were distributions of career longevity, discharge age, contribution rate, and 
VSP amount.  
From the longevity and age distributions, the portion of officers discharged prior 
to reaching retirement eligibility was determined.  It was determined that O1 will retire 
on average 2–6 years later than O1Es.  For this target population, a conventional 
retirement planning approach was applied to retroactively determine the investment 
contribution needed during the Marine’s career to meet retirement goals.  Without the 
benefit of VSP benefit, the mean contribution rate rose to 23.1 percent compared to 
 44
6.1 percent with the benefit.  However, only 4.1 percent of the officers will even qualify 
for the VSP benefit. 
The benefits provided by the VSP and TERA program are significant enough to 
allow members of the affected populations to fund their long-term retirement goals given 
wise investments with consistent rates of return.  The issue as pointed out in this study is 
that the percentage of officers that will actually be eligible for those benefits is relatively 
low, in particular those officers in the O1 career path. 
The Marine Corps will use the combined effects of all of the parameters to reach 
its desired manpower end strength.  The modeling and simulation does, however, offer 
the individual Marine officer some statistical outcomes of the Marine Corps officer career 
longevity and promotion probability.  This will offer the ability to make informed career 
and retirement investment decisions earlier.   
B. RECOMMENDATION 
The formulated model was developed as a proof of concept to forecast the 
terminal wealth potential based solely on the officer’s accumulation of basic pay with the 
assumption that entitlements such as subsistence and housing allowances were applied, in 
whole, to those expenses for which they were intended.  The risk of early career 
termination that Marines were exposed to as the result of imposed Marine Corps 
manpower drawdown parameters was modeled.  An element of the wealth forecasting 
that was beyond the scope of this study was the internal risk tolerance of each Marine in 
the population.  Marines with higher risk tolerance have the opportunity for greater 
variance in their wealth predictions, both positive and negative. The addition of a 
parameter that incorporates the individual investment preferences or risk tolerance will 
produce a model with greater accuracy for the individual Marine.   
There are additional sources of hidden income that may be modeled as well. The 
lack of a requirement to pay state taxes as well as the variances in the amount of state 
taxes paid by many Marines presents the opportunity for additional hidden income in the 
form of a reduced expense that may be invested throughout a Marine’s career.  This 
additional income could have a dramatic effect on the forecasted contribution rates as 
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well as the career decisions of the affected population.  The addition of a simulated 
variable that models the distribution of historic state tax rates for each state would 
increase the accuracy of the model’s output, but was beyond the scope of this study.  
C. FURTHER STUDY 
This study focused exclusively on the effects on the career longevity and working 
year contribution rates of active duty officers as the result of the manpower drawdown 
parameters imposed by the Marine Corps. The Army is in the midst of similar force 
reductions.  This study may benefit both the Army and the other populations within the 
Marine Corps.  The tools used in this study highlighted the utility of simulations to 
provide a broader distribution of model outcomes.   
The figure caption for appendix A needs to be under the figure. You can 
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Pay Increases (1965–2037) Trendlines & Forecasts 
                    
  Year 
Actual 
Data Linear Logarithmic Polynomial Power Exponential 
Moving 
Average   
  1965 0.0600 0.0734 0.0939 0.0733 0.1290 0.0803     
  1966 0.0320 0.0723 0.0825 0.0722 0.0971 0.0779 0.0460   
  1967 0.0560 0.0711 0.0759 0.0711 0.0822 0.0757 0.0440   
  1968 0.0680 0.0700 0.0712 0.0700 0.0731 0.0735 0.0620   
  1969 0.1260 0.0689 0.0675 0.0689 0.0667 0.0714 0.0970   
  1970 0.0810 0.0678 0.0645 0.0678 0.0619 0.0693 0.1035   
  1971 0.0790 0.0667 0.0620 0.0666 0.0581 0.0673 0.0800   
  1972 0.0720 0.0655 0.0598 0.0655 0.0550 0.0653 0.0755   
  1973 0.0670 0.0644 0.0579 0.0644 0.0524 0.0634 0.0695   
  1974 0.0620 0.0633 0.0561 0.0633 0.0502 0.0616 0.0645   
  1975 0.0552 0.0622 0.0546 0.0622 0.0483 0.0598 0.0586   
  1976 0.0500 0.0611 0.0531 0.0611 0.0466 0.0581 0.0526   
  1977 0.0360 0.0600 0.0518 0.0600 0.0451 0.0564 0.0430   
  1978 0.0620 0.0588 0.0506 0.0588 0.0438 0.0548 0.0490   
  1979 0.0550 0.0577 0.0495 0.0577 0.0425 0.0532 0.0585   
  1980 0.0700 0.0566 0.0484 0.0566 0.0414 0.0516 0.0625   
  1981 0.1170 0.0555 0.0474 0.0555 0.0404 0.0501 0.0935   
  1982 0.1200 0.0544 0.0465 0.0544 0.0395 0.0487 0.1185   
  1983 0.0400 0.0532 0.0456 0.0533 0.0386 0.0473 0.0800   
  1984 0.0400 0.0521 0.0448 0.0521 0.0378 0.0459 0.0400   
  1985 0.0400 0.0510 0.0440 0.0510 0.0371 0.0446 0.0400   
  1986 0.0300 0.0499 0.0432 0.0499 0.0364 0.0433 0.0350   
  1987 0.0300 0.0488 0.0425 0.0488 0.0357 0.0420 0.0300   
  1988 0.0200 0.0476 0.0418 0.0477 0.0351 0.0408 0.0250   
  1989 0.0410 0.0465 0.0411 0.0466 0.0345 0.0396 0.0305   
  1990 0.0360 0.0454 0.0405 0.0454 0.0339 0.0385 0.0385   
  1991 0.0410 0.0443 0.0398 0.0443 0.0334 0.0373 0.0385   
  1992 0.0420 0.0432 0.0393 0.0432 0.0329 0.0363 0.0415   
  1993 0.0370 0.0420 0.0387 0.0421 0.0325 0.0352 0.0395   
  1994 0.0220 0.0409 0.0381 0.0410 0.0320 0.0342 0.0295   
  1995 0.0260 0.0398 0.0376 0.0398 0.0316 0.0332 0.0240   
  1996 0.0240 0.0387 0.0371 0.0387 0.0312 0.0322 0.0250   
  1997 0.0300 0.0376 0.0366 0.0376 0.0308 0.0313 0.0270   
  1998 0.0280 0.0365 0.0361 0.0365 0.0304 0.0304 0.0290   
  1999 0.0360 0.0353 0.0356 0.0354 0.0301 0.0295 0.0320   
  2000 0.0480 0.0342 0.0351 0.0342 0.0297 0.0287 0.0420   
  2001 0.0370 0.0331 0.0347 0.0331 0.0294 0.0278 0.0425   
  2002 0.0350 0.0320 0.0342 0.0320 0.0291 0.0270 0.0360   
  2003 0.0470 0.0309 0.0338 0.0309 0.0288 0.0262 0.0410   
  2004 0.0420 0.0297 0.0334 0.0297 0.0285 0.0255 0.0445   
  2005 0.0350 0.0286 0.0330 0.0286 0.0282 0.0247 0.0385   
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Pay Increases (1965–2037) Trendlines & Forecasts (Cont.) 
 Year 
Actual 
Data Linear Logarithmic Polynomial Power Exponential 
Moving 
Average   
  2006 0.0310 0.0275 0.0326 0.0275 0.0279 0.0240 0.0330   
  2007 0.0460 0.0264 0.0322 0.0264 0.0276 0.0233 0.0385   
  2008 0.0350 0.0253 0.0318 0.0253 0.0274 0.0226 0.0405   
  2009 0.0390 0.0241 0.0315 0.0241 0.0271 0.0220 0.0370   
  2010 0.0340 0.0230 0.0311 0.0230 0.0269 0.0214 0.0365   
  2011 0.0140 0.0219 0.0308 0.0219 0.0266 0.0207 0.0240   
  2012 0.0160 0.0208 0.0304 0.0208 0.0264 0.0201 0.0150   
  2013 0.0170 0.0197 0.0301 0.0196 0.0262 0.0195 0.0165   
  2014 0.0100 0.0185 0.0297 0.0185 0.0260 0.0190 0.0135   
  2015 0.0050 0.0174 0.0294 0.0174 0.0258 0.0184 0.0075   
  2016 0.0100 0.0163 0.0291 0.0163 0.0256 0.0179 0.0075   
  2017 0.0150 0.0152 0.0288 0.0151 0.0254 0.0174 0.0125   
  2018   0.0141 0.0285 0.0140 0.0252 0.0169 0.0125   
  2019   0.0130 0.0282 0.0129 0.0250 0.0164 0.0125   
  2020   0.0118 0.0279 0.0118 0.0248 0.0159 0.0125   
  2021   0.0107 0.0276 0.0106 0.0246 0.0154 0.0125   
  2022   0.0096 0.0273 0.0095 0.0244 0.0150 0.0125   
  2023   0.0085 0.0270 0.0084 0.0243 0.0146 0.0125   
  2024   0.0074 0.0268 0.0072 0.0241 0.0141 0.0125   
  2025   0.0062 0.0265 0.0061 0.0239 0.0137 0.0125   
  2026   0.0051 0.0262 0.0050 0.0238 0.0133 0.0125   
  2027   0.0040 0.0260 0.0039 0.0236 0.0129 0.0125   
  2028   0.0029 0.0257 0.0027 0.0235 0.0126 0.0125   
  2029   0.0018 0.0254 0.0016 0.0233 0.0122 0.0125   
  2030   0.0006 0.0252 0.0005 0.0232 0.0119 0.0125   
  2031   -0.0005 0.0249 -0.0007 0.0230 0.0115 0.0125   
  2032   -0.0016 0.0247 -0.0018 0.0229 0.0112 0.0125   
  2033   -0.0027 0.0245 -0.0029 0.0228 0.0109 0.0125   
  2034   -0.0038 0.0242 -0.0041 0.0226 0.0105 0.0125   
  2035   -0.0050 0.0240 -0.0052 0.0225 0.0102 0.0125   
  2036   -0.0061 0.0238 -0.0063 0.0224 0.0099 0.0125   
  2037   -0.0072 0.0235 -0.0074 0.0222 0.0096 0.0125   
                    
                    
  Error Estimates             
  Method RMSE             
  Linear   0.0192             
  Logarithmic 0.0213             
  Polynomial 0.0192             
  Power 0.0246             
  Exponential 0.0198             
  Moving Average 0.0098             
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